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Family Law Reform and the Feminist Debate: Actually-Existing Islamic 







For an increasing number of Muslim women and women‟s rights activists, the 
stark disparity between the principles of justice and equality guaranteed by international 
and domestic legal norms on the one hand, and the oppressive environment of their 
homes that is legitimated by repressive family laws on the other, has acted as the catalyst 
for a unified call for reform.  In the Maghreb, an influential Islamic feminist movement 
has successfully lobbied for family law reform, and this movement‟s positivist 
framework has recently been adopted as the model for Malaysia‟s increasingly vociferous 
demands for gender equality.  Although secular feminists in the West frequently criticize 
the aims of this Islamic feminism as an oxymoronic anti-feminism, the Maghreby 
movement serves as proof that only an Islamic feminist reform model can serve as a 
pragmatic challenge to discriminatory laws. 
 




For an increasing number of Muslim women and women‟s rights activists, the 
stark disparity between the principles of justice and equality guaranteed by international 
and domestic legal norms on the one hand, and the oppressive environment of their 
homes that is legitimated by repressive family laws on the other, has acted as the catalyst 
for a unified call for reform.  In the Maghreb nations of North Africa, an influential 
Islamic feminist movement has successfully lobbied for family law reform, and this 
movement‟s positivist legal framework has recently been adopted as the model for 
Malaysia‟s increasingly vociferous demands for gender equality.  Although secular 
feminists in the West frequently criticize the aims of this Islamic feminism as an 
oxymoronic anti-feminism, the Maghreby movement serves as proof that an Islamic 
feminist reform model can serve as a viable and pragmatic challenge to discriminatory 
laws.  
In spite of the coercive efforts of the forces of colonization and globalization, 
which have sought to modernize and secularize developing nations, states throughout the 
Muslim world have maintained their allegiance to traditional Shari‟a law.  Many polities 
heavily influenced by Islamic traditions have developed a dual system of governance that 
supports the liberal ideals of democracy and egalitarianism within the public sphere of 
civil society while simultaneously institutionalizing the subordination of women in the 
private sphere of their homes via discriminatory, Shari‟a-infused family laws (Collectif 
95 Maghreb-Egalite [Collectif 95], 2005, p. 17).  These laws continue to stifle the agency 
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of millions of women by restricting their participation within what is considered by 
observant Muslims to be the foundation of Islamic society: the family unit.  This 
repression has given rise to a growing movement of Maghreby Islamic feminists that has, 
over the past decade, successfully couched their demands for family law reform within 
the context of their religion.  
Both fundamentalist Muslims and secular feminists have attacked this reform-
minded brand of Islamic feminism,
2
 which seeks to utilize the egalitarian tenets of Islam 
as a basis upon which to expose and undermine the unjust nature of misogynistic family 
laws.  While the former view Islamic feminism as a threat to traditional values and beliefs 
(Fong, 2006), the latter see it as an apologist philosophy that serves to undermine the 
liberal goals of secular feminism while legitimating an inherently unjust religion (Mojab, 
2001, pp. 130-131).  Although the critical feminist critique does present a compelling 
interrogation of the merits of Islamic feminism qua social theory, it fails to appreciate the 
very real gains currently being made by Muslim women using Islamic feminism as a 
framework for grassroots activism.  Thus, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate that 
while some of the current critiques espoused by secular feminists do serve as reasonable 
challenges to Islamic feminism, the facts on the ground demonstrate that Islamic 
feminism, as it has emerged in the Maghreb, is nonetheless promulgating genuine family 
law reform.  
 The first section of this article presents a sampling of the current line of critical 
feminist critique aimed at Islamic feminism.  As such, the arguments of Haideh Moghissi 
and Shahrzad Mojab provide examples of the secular feminist voices informing the 
ongoing debate vis-à-vis the proper role feminism ought to play in combating gendered 
discrimination and oppression in the Muslim world.  This paper then provides a 
comparative outline of the historical contexts out of which the current Maghreby model 
of family law reform has emerged, while examining the evolution of family laws in the 
former French colonies of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria.  The following section presents 
an analysis of recent family law reform in this region, paying special attention to the 
contributions of the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalite (Collectif), the Maghreby women‟s 
advocacy group whose One Hundred Measures and Provisions for an Egalitarian 
Codification of the Personal Status Codes and Family Law in the Maghreb (One 
Hundred Measures) laid the foundation for this successful reform movement.  This paper 
then suggests the transnational viability of this women‟s rights framework by examining 
its adoption by Malaysian family law reformers.  
 
Secular Feminist Critiques of Islamic Feminism  
 For secular feminists like Moghissi and Mojab, the very idea of Islamic feminism 
demonstrates a “contradiction in terms” (Mojab, 2001, p. 131).  These critics direct much 
of their indictment of Islamic feminism at those writers living in the West, who the 
former view as being detached from the real needs of women living in societies heavily 
influenced by Islamic norms. For Moghissi and Mojab, because Islamic feminists seek to 
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promote reform from within the strictures of what they view to be a misogynistic and 
discriminatory religious framework, they cannot hope to present a real challenge to the 
dominant patriarchal political, social an cultural systems (Mojab, 2001).  In fact, as a 
result of their uncritical embrace of religiosity, Islamic feminists serve to prop up the 
very systems that oppress Muslim women.  
 In Moghissi‟s Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern 
Analysis (Moghissi, 1999), the author set out to shed light on what she viewed as a 
disturbing trend in academic circles: the idealization of women‟s capacity for agency in 
fundamentalist Islamic societies.  According to Moghissi, many Islamic feminist scholars 
actively downplay what ought to be considered serious violations of the rights and 
dignity of Muslim women in an attempt to reduce the backlash of “Islamophobia” being 
experienced by Muslims living in the West, and in so doing “…call attention to the 
„brighter sides‟ for women of Islamification, seeking acceptance of degrading practices as 
simply a „different way of life‟” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 46).  This trend of legitimating 
practices that serve to reinforce patriarchal norms has been demonstrated repeatedly in 
the works of Laila Ahmed and Saba Mahmood, both of whom have sought to present the 
practice of veiling as a mechanism of women‟s empowerment, rather than as a tool of 
patriarchal subordination.
3
   
That is not to say that Muslim women who have donned the veil or have 
otherwise sought out a personal level of religious piety or political activism cannot have 
done so on their own accord.   To be sure, Ahmed and others have provided ample 
evidence that women in Egypt and Iran have embraced Islamism as an exercise of their 
agency, rather than as a means of complying with the demands of patriarchy.  However, 
what many of these writers do overlook is that in some Muslim-dominated societies, “the 
„choice‟ for women is between wearing a veil or not staying alive” (Moghissi, 1999, p. 
43).  Thus, in legitimating such traditions steeped in patriarchal views on modesty and 
chastity, some Islamic feminists ignore the very real suffering experienced by Muslim 
women whose agency is genuinely stifled by oppressive norms and practices.  
In writing about the failings of Islamic feminism in Iran, Mojab repeats Hammed 
Shahidian‟s claim that because the movement seeks only to make patriarchy more 
palatable, rather than abolishing it completely, it has become an “oxymoron” (Mojab, 
2001, p. 131).  “Thus,” according to Mojab, “far from being an alternative to secular, 
radical and socialist feminisms, „Islamic feminism‟ justifies unequal gender relations” 
(Mojab, 2001). And theoretically, from a secular feminist perspective, this argument 
rings true: attempts at reforming family laws anywhere in Islamic societies can never be a 
truly feminist endeavor, seeing how any legal changes would occur within a politico-
socio-religious system in which men wield ultimate control.  However, this problem is 
not exclusive to Islamic societies; to be sure, secular feminists have long called for the 
replacement of all systems informed by patriarchal domination by systems that engender 
equality (Tong, 2003).   
For both Moghissi and Mojab, there seems to be little, if any, middle ground in 
the debate between secular feminism and Islamic feminism.  In fact Mojab, echoing the  
polarizing “You‟re either with us or against us” posturing of President George W. Bush‟s 
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war on terror, states that because “[v]iolence against women is rampant throughout the 
Islamic world,” we must ask “Which side are you on?” (Mojab, 2001).  This seems to 
imply that those who support the Islamic feminist ideal of reforming oppressive social, 
cultural and religious norms from within the framework of Islam must be on the “side” of 
violence against women.   
At this point, one must ask two questions.  First, does this “us versus them” 
rhetoric constructively address issues involving the treatment of Muslim women?  In 
pitting secular feminism against Islamic feminism, critics representing the former vein 
stifle any potential for discourse and cooperation between the two camps.  Furthermore, 
by painting such complex gender issues in black and white, writers like Moghissi and 
Mojab ignore the fact that there are a variety of voices, aims and practices that make up 
the reformist Islamic feminist movement.  And these varied projects share a common 
goal—the diminution of the suffering experienced by millions of women living under 
repressive norms.  The achievement of this basic and urgent goal would be better well-
served if secular feminists would seek ways to work with, rather than disparage, Islamic 
feminists.   
The other important question that ought to be posed to these critical secular 
feminists is whether they have a viable alternative to Islamic feminism that would serve 
as a framework within which reform could be engendered within Islamic societies.  If 
their true aim is to “launch a revolutionary war against [Islam]” (Al-Faruqi, 2000, p. 73) 
in an attempt to give rise to the liberal ideals of democracy and egalitarianism, one must 
challenge such a plan as lofty idealism at best, or audacious cultural imperialism at its 
worst.  I suspect, however, that these secular feminists prefer to present their theories and 
proposed projects solely within the pages of academic journals and in scholarly debates.  
While theoretically much of the invective aimed at Islamic feminism might be reasonable 
from a secular feminist perspective, the fact remains that as the debate rages on, countless 
Muslim women continue to live under stifling patriarchal laws and customs.  Thus, the 
supercilious ideals espoused by secular feminists like Moghissi and Mojab are simply 
ineffective in addressing the grave situation faced by many Muslim women, while the 
grassroots movement emerging from the Maghreb has provided a platform for significant 
reform.    
 
The Evolution of Maghreby Family Law  
Because the ideals of secular feminism will not likely ever completely displace 
patriarchal systems of subordination, we ought to look elsewhere for a pragmatic 
approach aimed at easing the suffering of women while providing greater opportunities 
for women‟s agency to flourish.  In recent years, a women‟s rights movement based in 
part upon the principles of Islamic feminism has emerged in the Maghreb, and it has 
effected dramatic and positive change in the area of family law.  This model of reform 
just may be the catalyst for a sweeping dissemination of women‟s rights norms.  
An examination of family law provides much insight into how a given society 
treats its female citizens.  In particular, the body of Islamic family law acts as a gauge by 
which we may determine the degree to which women living under Islamic norms have 
attained genuine equality.  Because these family laws define such aspects of women‟s 
lives as the proper age of marriage, their obligation to obey their husbands, and their 
ability to divorce, these norms are of paramount importance to those hoping to ensure the 
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protection of women‟s rights.  Throughout much of the Muslim world in recent years 
there has developed a dualism between the “public” political rights women are 
guaranteed under domestic law and the restrictions placed on their “private” home lives 
by a separate code of family laws (Collectif 95, 2005, p. 17).  In societies wherein 
repressive family laws continue to trump the “public” rights protected by state statutes, 
women cannot hope to realize any real degree of equality or security.  
Aside from the system of rights and obligations imposed by Islamic family law, 
these norms also act as a central defining characteristic of Muslim self-awareness.   
 
Being the main aspect of Shari'a that has successfully resisted 
displacement by European codes during the colonial period, and survived 
various degrees or forms of secularization of the state and its institutions 
in many Islamic countries, [family law] has become for most Muslims the 
symbol of their Islamic identity, the hard irreducible core of what it means 
to be a Muslim today (“Islamic Family Law”). 
 
Viewed in this light, one can better understand why an Islamic feminism ought to be 
accepted as a legitimate and effective movement for change, for this ideology expressly 
acknowledges that for many Muslim women, their self-identity as believers precedes 
their gendered identification.  Secular feminisms largely ignore this distinction, and seek 
to define all women primarily in terms of their gender, often at the expense of one‟s 
religious identity (Al-Faruqi, 2000, p. 74).  The women of the Maghreby family law 
reform movement have developed a platform predicated upon the appreciation of Muslim 
identity, and have thus been able to effect significant social and political change.  
Although the Maghreby nations of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria share similar 
historical and cultural backgrounds, their comparative women‟s rights paradigms have 
evolved along quite different paths.  Whereas Tunisia embraced many progressive legal 
reforms upon its independence from France in 1956 and Morocco‟s monarch has in 
recent years instituted significant family law reform, Algeria has held fast to many 
inegalitarian and repressive family laws.  The following outline of the post-colonial 
histories of these three nations aims to clarify the historical context from which today‟s 
prominent Maghreby model of family law reform has emerged.  
 Tunisia declared its independence from France in 1956, following nearly eight 
decades of colonial rule.  Habib Bourguiba, the leader of the nation‟s successful struggle 
for autonomy, emerged as the new republic‟s first president.  Bourguiba immediately set 
out to modernize Tunisia, and understood that a key to realizing this goal was the 
adoption of democratic legal reform.  Central to this sweeping reform movement was the 
enactment of the progressive Personal Status Code.  This codification of family law 
served as a radical departure from the traditional, Shari‟a-influenced norms, as it inter 
alia criminalized polygamy and established strict and egalitarian guidelines on divorce, 
thus ending the customary practice of informal marital repudiation that gave men 
virtually absolute control in setting the terms of a marriage.  For a time this divorce law 
was more liberal than that of the United States, which did not see its first “no-fault” 
divorce statutes until 1969 (Mayer, 1995, pp. 433-434).   
Although this transition was indeed a drastic departure from the conservative 
Shari‟a, it was not a wholly secular movement.  Considering that Bourguiba was himself 
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a Muslim, he ought to be viewed as a pragmatist rather than a radical iconoclast (“Habib 
Bourguiba,” 2000).  As such, Bourguiba sought to create a family law flexible enough to 
meet the needs of all Tunisians, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  In so doing, he utilized 
a liberal interpretation of the Qur‟an that promotes equality and views the practice of 
polygamy as an irrelevant anachronism (Panebianco, 2004).  Tunisia‟s Personal Status 
Code remains the most progressive body of family laws in the Maghreb and many of its 
principles set the standard for Islamic feminists currently pushing for further Maghreby 
family law reform.  That said, Tunisia is not a wholly egalitarian state today, as its 
women still face de jure discrimination in the form of inheritance laws that grant men 
twice the amount of remuneration allowed to women (Collectif 95, 2005, p. 131). 
While the evolution of Morocco‟s family law was not as rapid as that of 
Tunisia‟s, the former has in recent years seen radical changes in the status of women‟s 
rights.  Like Tunisia, Morocco gained its independence from France in 1956.  However, 
the two nations pursued divergent paths as they developed women‟s rights norms.  
Seeking to demonstrate its newfound independence from French influence, Morocco 
reaffirmed the primacy of many legal principles established centuries before within the 
Maliki school of Shari‟a exegesis.  As part of this return to conservative, traditional legal 
norms, Morocco codified its family laws within the Moudawana (Mayer, 1995, p. 434).  
This new body of family law superseded Morocco‟s constitutional guarantees of equality 
and effectively relegated women to the status of “adult minors,” (Pitman, 2004, p. 4) 
wholly dependent upon their male guardians and/or husbands for guidance and 
approbation.  
Among the most discriminatory and harmful aspects of the Moroccan 
Moudawana were the rules setting the standards for marriage age and those conferring 
the marital obligation of “obedience” upon women.  Under the established family law, 
girls as young as 15 could be coerced into unattractive marriage arrangements by a wali, 
or matrimonial guardian.  Likewise, women well into adulthood found their marriage 
plans being dictated by male mediators (Collectif 95, 2005, pp. 48-49).  Once married, 
women found themselves bound by an institutionalized mandate to defer to and obey 
their husbands.  Too often, husbands posited this Shari‟a-based obligation as divine 
justification for abusing their wives.  This trend was evinced by a 2000 survey conducted 
by the Association Democratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), wherein 70% of the 
male respondents viewed physical abuse as a legitimate means of resolving domestic 
conflicts (Collectif 95, 2005, p. 76). 
Signs of family law reform surfaced in Morocoo shortly following the crowning 
of King Muhammed VI in 1999.  Following nearly a decade of grass-roots, rights-based 
activism that included a massive 2001 march against violence and poverty, the new king 
signaled his intent to pay heed to the demands of reformists by organizing a meeting with 
leading women‟s rights activists.  This meeting resulted in an agreement by the 
government to consider reforming the Moudawana (Pitman, 2004, p. 4).  
The next three years saw intense debate and lobbying by women‟s rights 
organizations.  Much of the discourse was informed by a progressive Qur‟anic 
interpretation that emphasized gender equality and domestic harmony.  In February 2004, 
King Mohammed IV enacted Morocco‟s new family law.  In a previous statement 
promoting the law, the king invoked Islamic principles as codified in the Qur‟an as a 
means of affirming the legitimacy of the call for reform (Radu, 2003).  
Journal of International Women‟s Studies Vol. 8 #4 May 2007                                    55 
 
The new body of law instituted several significant changes, including the raising 
of the marriageable age of women to 18 and the abolishment of the obligation of 
obedience.  This latter reform is ironic when we consider that the American Southern 
Baptist Convention recently reaffirmed the inviolability of the Biblical mandate calling 
on women to submit to their husbands in all domestic matters (Moghadam, 2002, p. 
1160).  Although polygamy is still legal under the new law, its practice is greatly 
restricted by a set of conditions so rigorous as to render it virtually unfeasible.  This 
religion-inspired reform movement demonstrates that positive change can result from an 
Islamic feminist framework that seeks to engender greater equality through the use of 
religious principles.  
In contrast to the relatively smooth road to independence experienced by Tunisia 
and Morocco, Algeria faced 8 years of brutal internecine warfare against their French 
occupiers.  When the smoke cleared and Algeria declared its independence in 1962, the 
new republican government estimated its dead at nearly one million (“Algerian War of 
Independence,” 2003).  The 1990s saw even more carnage as Algeria suffered nearly a 
decade of terrorist attacks by Islamic militants and civil conflict that killed upwards of 
150,000 persons and resulted in the empowerment of a strong-arm military cadre that still 
wields great political influence today (“Algeria Politics,” 2003). While terrorist attacks 
and civil unrest have decreased substantially in recent years, the government nonetheless 
noted that 17, 200 persons were reported “missing or disappeared” in 2004, nearly half of 
whom went missing due to government actions (“Algeria: Country Reports,” 2005).  This 
ongoing climate of violent unrest and the influence of fundamentalist Islamists have 
stifled any significant reform of the nation‟s 1984 Family Code.  This set of family laws, 
like Morocco‟s Moudawana, institutionalizes discrimination against women thus 
reinforces their subordination within the home.  
The women‟s rights group Women Living Under Muslim Laws has identified 
several aspects of the Algerian family law that require immediate reform.  Under the 
current statutes, walis continue to dictate the terms of many matrimonial agreements by 
passing judgment on the suitability of a prospective husband, thus rendering impotent a 
woman‟s agency in choosing her mate.  While a woman‟s right to divorce remains 
subject to a series of qualifications, men have retained an absolute right to unilateral 
repudiation, or talaq (“Algeria: Statement from the Collectif,” 2004).  Other restrictions, 
such as that prohibiting women from marrying non-Muslims, serve to undermine 
women‟s autonomy and thus reinforce the view of women as perpetual minors incapable 
of making intimate decisions for themselves.  Such perceptions engender a climate of 
violent subordination wherein abuse is rampant.  While half of Algerian men recently 
surveyed viewed beating their wives as a legitimate demonstration of their “undisputed 
power,” (Collectif 95, 2005, p. 76), social pressures and unjust laws placing the burden of 
proof upon the victim deter women from seeking redress, and an estimated 70% of 
female victims of domestic violence fail to lodge a formal complaint (“Algeria: Country 
Reports,” 2005).   
While women‟s rights groups such as the Association for the Promotion of 
Women‟s Rights (APDF) and the Independent Association for the Victory of Women‟s 
Rights (AITFD) have framed their calls for family law reform within an Islam-informed 
movement, the Algerian government continues to kow tow to the vociferous threats from 
fundamentalist Islamists, and has thus been hesitant to take any decisive action.  
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Although the government recently approved some amendments to the 1984 Family Code, 
many women‟s rights activists view these changes as  piecemeal and ineffectual reforms 
(“Algeria: Statement from the Collectif,” 2004).  Unfortunately, as long as Algeria faces 
domestic terrorist threats and a repressive government, significant reform is unlikely.  
Collectif 95 Maghreb-Egalite and Reform 
For over a decade, the Collectif has been a leading voice in the movement for family law 
reform.  In the early 1990s, this umbrella organization brought together some of the most 
respected Maghreby women‟s rights activists in order to produce a unified call for legal 
reform.  The group subsequently produced the One Hundred Measures, a comprehensive 
challenge to the discriminatory family laws in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria.  This 
positivist document is unique in that it combines the Qur‟anic ideals of equality and 
justice with secular domestic and international legal norms in order to create a holistic 
and complete argument for family law reform. 
In her critique of Islamic feminism, Mojab claims that “the project of Islamic feminists is 
extremely limited in both theory and practice,” and that “it lacks a theoretical framework 
of rights and law” (Mojab, 2001, p. 139).  However, an examination of the texts at the 
center of the family law debate and Morocco‟s subsequent acceptance of key Islamic 
feminist principles wholly dispels these claims.  The Collectif‟s One Hundred Measures 
and its more recent contribution to the family law reform movement, the Guide to 
Equality in the Family in the Maghreb (Guide to Equality) contain cogent arguments for 
change.  In framing its call for reform, the Collectif posits arguments based upon four 
sources of authority: Qur‟anic principles; national constitutional law; international human 
rights law, and sociological studies investigating interactions within Maghreby families 
(Collectif 95, 2005, p. 9).  By combining religious mandates with secular law, the 
Collectif has produced a formidable argument for family law reform. 
Not only is this reform model theoretically sound, it has also been demonstrated to be an 
efficacious instrument of change.  Morocco‟s parliament and King Muhammed IV relied 
heavily upon the One Hundred Measures and the Guide to Equality as they met to 
discuss potential family law reforms, and the resulting family law cites the multi-faceted 
framework outlined in these texts as the basis of its authoritativeness.  In Algeria, this 
model has stimulated dialogue among the ulema, or Islamic scholars, who are currently 
considering amending the nation‟s statutes.  Some of these men are now openly 
questioning the divinity of Shari‟a law, creating the possibility for a progressive Qur‟anic 
exegesis to replace the traditional, conservative one (Naciri, 2005).  Thus, these 
successful efforts of the Collectif demonstrate that an Islamic feminist voice is a much-
needed and powerful agent of change in the ongoing debate on family law reform.   
The Malasysian women‟s rights movement has recently embraced the Maghreby model 
of family law reform, demonstrating that this framework can be adapted to cultural 
contexts quite different from that of North Africa.  Finding inspiration in Morocco‟s 
successful legal transformation, the women‟s rights group Sisters in Islam (SIS) has 
tailored the Guide to Equality to address the specific needs of Malaysian women (Anwar, 
2005).   
Zainah Anwar, executive director of SIS, has noted that the movement for reform has met 
with significant success as it struggles to overturn discriminatory family laws.  Following 
discussions between SIS and government officials, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi agreed to consider amending the controversial 2005 Islamic Family Law.  
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Of primary concern of women‟s rights activists are amendments both making polygamy 
more accessible to men and allowing men to use the property of their primary wives to 
support the new wives.  As an immediate compromise intended to ease the concerns of 
activists while the Badawai government considers revising these amendments, several 
prejudicial inconsistencies within the existing statute have been addressed, and Anwar 
expressed her belief that the changes will serve to “minimise any injustice” (“SIS: Most 
Problems in Islamic Family Law Clarified,” 2006.)   
While it is true that the theoretical critiques of Islamic feminism espoused by secular 
feminists are often soundly-reasoned and cogently articulated, this discourse fails to 
provide an actionable call for reforming the systems of subordination faced by many of 
the world‟s women.  For the millions of women currently living under discriminatory 
Islamic family laws only resolute activism, not elitist censure, will alleviate their 
suffering.  A central weakness of the arguments made by secular feminists like Mojab 
and Moghissi who favor radical institutional reform is that they encourage the rejection 
of what for many Muslim women forms the core of their self-identity—their faith (Al-
Faruqi, 2000, p. 73).  Thus for many Muslims, the secular feminist call for reform 
presents a threat to women‟s agency and identity no less repugnant than that posed by 
unjust and repressive family laws.   
The Islamic feminist model of reform developed by the Maghreby feminists is 
responsible for stimulating significant family law reform.  The transformation undergone 
in Morocco demonstrates that calls for change based upon Islamic principles can act as 
highly effective agents of change.  While Algeria has not embraced such radical reform, 
the Maghreby movement has at least encouraged the ulema there to open the doors of 
debate, and such discourse is the catalyst of reform.  And seeing how Malaysian Islamic 
feminists are currently using the Maghreby framework engenders hope that this model 
can be adapted to other Muslim nations wherein calls for abolishing anachronistic family 
laws are growing.  By serving as a bridge between Islamic tradition and the demands of 
modern life, Islamic feminism provides a pragmatic framework for the reform that is so 
urgently needed.  
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